Philosophical Problems of the Legal Sciences: Ideas 3800-FPNP25-K-OG

What are the philosophical problems of legal sciences?

Philosophy of law, understood as the philosophy about law, problematizes its subject, and hence makes its aim - i.a. - answering questions about the nature of the phenomenon, which the law is, as well as about conditions and requirements of the philosophical reflection on law. Answers to these questions could be delivered from different methodological standpoints; during the classes we would like to present the approaches that are philosophical in origin, external to legal and empirical sciences. (However, some of them postulate a reduction of the philosophy of law [and often also the legal sciences themselves] to [other] empirical sciences). Some of the problems of the philosophy of law in this meaning (which will be the subject of the classes) are as follows: is the law as a phenomenon something irreducible to other phenomena (social, political etc.)? And if so, why and what is the place of the legal sciences among other sciences? What are the conditions of “doing” the legal sciences and the philosophy of law? What requirements shall the theory of law meet? What is the law as a matter of fact? What is the difference between law and custom (usage) and morality? Can the common ideas about law and popular theories concerning its nature withstand philosophical critique? Can philosophy justify the existence of law or rather does it deliver arguments against its occurrence in human society? Can one classify different legal orders as better or worse and if so, on what basis?

Why is it worth learning?

The problems indicated above are one of the most important from the perspective of the philosophy of law as well as the perspective of the legal sciences, and also cognate disciplines, as social philosophy, philosophy of politics, philosophy of culture, philosophy of science etc., and sciences (sociology, political science, cultural studies, anthropology, methodology of sciences etc.). Those problems are still explored in modern philosophy (i.e. since the end of the 18th century), not losing their topicality, but gaining the depth and breadth of understanding.

How will the classes be conducted?

Each of the meetings will take a form of a seminar (discussion group, discussion seminar). Instructors (or one of them) will introduce the participants to the subject of the meeting; after the introduction the discussion, concerning a text chosen (in regard to the conversations with the participants), announced and made available earlier, will be opened. Instructors will fulfill in the discussion the function of moderators and - if needed - either support the participants or indicate some of the worth mentioning aspects of the discussed problems.
Readings will be chosen during the course in regard to the expectations of the participants (in many cases after a consultation with them) and eventual problems which may emerge during succeeding discussions. Nevertheless, they will fall into the thematic areas presented in the following plan. The bibliography presented below, in the plan and under the rubric “Literatura” (“Literature”), is not an obligatory list of readings. The plan of the course is divided into 15 classes, but if the semester turns out to be irregularly short or long, the number of classes will be respectively reduced or increased.

The plan of the course:

1. Organizational meeting. What is the philosophy of law? Modern and old, maximalist and minimalist apprehensions and approaches. Reflection on the adequacy of the divisions presented during the standard courses. The plan of the course. Any other business.

2.-3. Legal reductionisms, part 1. Positivism – law as a language-entity
Is law reducible to the products of language? Law as a sort of convention. Intentions and meaning in the legal language. Classical positivist ideas and their critics. Law in the light of some contemporary theories from the area of the philosophy of language.
Ronald Dworkin, Imperium prawa, trans. Jan Winczorek, Warszawa 2006.
Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, Pojęcie prawa, trans. Jan Woleński, Warszawa 1998.
David Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study, Hoboken (New Jersey) 2002.
Ruth Garrett Millikan, Beyond Concepts: Unicepts, Language, and Natural Information, Oxford 2017.

4. Legal reductionisms, part 1. Positivism – law in the light of contemporary analytic ontology
Contemporary state of the debate between positivists and non-positivists on the ground of analytic metaphysics. The social sources of law – is the content of law determined only by descriptive facts?
Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki, Metafizyka pozytywizmu prawniczego, „Principia. Pisma koncepcyjne z filozofii i socjologii teoretycznej”, Vol. 61–62, 2015, p. 19–40.
Mark Greenberg, How Facts Make Law, „Legal Theory”, Vol. 10: 2004, p. 157-198.
David Plunkett, A positivist route for explaining how facts make law, „Legal Theory”, Vol. 18: 2012, p. 139-207.

5. Legal reductionisms, part 2. Law as a social entity
Is law reducible to the products of social processes? Nature of law in the light of organic theories of society. Social progress and the development of law.
Léon Duguit, Souveraineté et liberté: leçons faites à l'Université Colombia (New-York), 1920-1921, Paris 1922.
Emile Durkheim, O podziale pracy społecznej, trans. Krzysztof Wakar, Warszawa 2020.
Jacek Srokosz, Rządy prawa jako efekt obiektywnego postępu społecznego – o solidarystycznej wizji genezy praworządności i ochrony praw jednostki, in: Andrzej Bator, Joanna Helios and Wioletta Jedlecka (ed.), Rządy prawa i europejska kultura prawna, Wrocław 2014.

6. Legal reductionisms, part 3. Law as a historical entity (Quid leges sine moribus?)
Can one actually know what is law and what is its content? Is the lawmaker able to change the law? In other words: is the so-called lawmaker a real maker of the law? Are men makers of history or is history a maker of men?
Autor Listopada (Henryk Rzewuski), O dawnych i teraźniejszych prawach polskich słów kilka, Kraków 1855.
Friedrich Carl von Savigny, O powołaniu naszych czasów do ustawodawstwa i nauki prawa, Warszawa 1964.

7.-8. Philosophy of law and philosophy of science
Legal sciences in the light of contemporary (post-Kuhnian) philosophy of science. The particularity of methods of legal sciences. Modes of representation of phenomena and the problem of idealization. Models and metaphors in the philosophy of law.
Ronald N. Giere, Scientific Perspectivism, Chicago 2006.
Björn Kralemann i Claas Lattmann, Models as Icons: Modeling Models in the Semiotic Framework of Peirce’s Theory of Signs, „Synthese”, Vol. 190: 2013, p. 3397-3420.
Leszek Nowak, Wstęp do idealizacyjnej teorii nauki, Warszawa 1977.
Michael Weisberg, Modeling, in: Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, Oxford 2016.
Sylwia Wojtczak, Iwona Witczak-Plisiecka and Rafał Augustyn, Metafory konceptualne jako narzędzia rozumowania i poznania prawniczego, Warszawa 2017.

9. Future of law and its concept, part 1. Morality, custom, Sittlichkeit – beginnings of the idea
Sittlichkeit as a notion explaining the relations of law, custom and morality. Beginnings of the idea: Sittlichkeit according to Kant and Hegel. What is customary law? What is the significance of the institutions in the moral and legal development of human individual and society? What is legal custom? History, morality and custom as dimensions and elements of the legal order. Law as an instrument of realization of human freedom.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Zasady filozofii prawa, trans. Adam Landman, Warszawa 1969.
Immanuel Kant, Metafizyka moralności, trans. Ewa Nowak, reviewed by Marek J. Siemek, Warszawa 2005.

10. Future of law and its concept, part 2. Morality, custom, Sittlichkeit – Frankfurt School
Sittlichkeit in the recent German philosophy: Axel Honneth. What is or will be Sittlichkeit in a democratic society? Is the register of institutions described by the classics of the idea of Sittlichkeit closed? What is the relation between ideas of Sittlichkeit and solidarity?
Axel Honneth, Das Recht der Freiheit. Grundriß einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit, Berlin 2011 (English translation: idem, Freedom’s right. The Social Foundations of Democratic Life, trans. Joseph Ganahl, Cambridge 2014).
Idem, Walka o uznanie. Moralna gramatyka konfliktów społecznych, trans. Jakub Duraj, Kraków 2012.

11. Future of law and its concept, part 3. Morality, custom, Sittlichkeit – evolution of law
Sittlichkeit and the idea of act and the age of action in Cieszkowski’s and Libelt’s thought. Philosophy of history as a part of the philosophy of law. How could the philosophy of law be instrumental in the description of culture’s, society’s and state’s evolution?
August Cieszkowski, Prolegomena do historiozofii, in: idem, Prolegomena do historiozofii, Bóg i palingeneza oraz mniejsze pisma filozoficzne z lat 1838-1842, Warszawa 2014.
Benedetto Croce, Historia Europy w XIX wieku, trans. Joanna Ugniewska, Warszawa 1998.
Karol Libelt, Samowładztwo rozumu i objawy filozofii słowiańskiej, in: idem, Samowładztwo rozumu i objawy filozofii słowiańskiej, O miłości ojczyzny, System umnictwa, O panteizmie w filozofii, Warszawa 2014.
Karl Marx, Przyczynek do krytyki heglowskiej filozofii prawa. Wstęp, trans. Leszek Kołakowski, in: idem and Friedrich Engels, Dzieła, t. I, Warszawa 1960.

12. Pragmatism and the philosophy of law
C.S. Peirce's theory of signs and the problems of legal interpretation. "False dichotomies" in legal thinking. Evolution of legal orders. Pragmatism and legal realism.
Hanna Buczyńska-Garewicz, Peirce, Warszawa 1966.
Eadem, Semiotyka Peirce’a, Warszawa 1994.
Susan Haack, On Legal Pragmatism: Where Does 'The Path of the Law' Lead Us?, “American Journal of Jurisprudence”, Vol. 50: 2005, p. 71–105.
Eadem, The Pragmatist Tradition: Lessons for Legal Theorists, “Washington University Law Review”, Vol. 95 Issue 5: 2018, p. 1049-82.

13.-14. Future of law and its concept, parts 4-5. Sittlichkeit and practical reason as an answer to semantic problems of the legal sciences and the language as such
Interpretation of Kant and Hegel by Brandom: translation of the Classical German Philosophy into the language and with use of the concepts from the field of analytical philosophy.
Robert B. Brandom, Reason in Philosophy. Animating Ideas, Cambridge (MA)-London 2009.
Idem, A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination: The Normative Fine Structure of the Judges’ Chain Novel, in: Graham Hubbs and Douglas Lind (ed.), Pragmatism, Law, and Language, New York-London 2014.
Idem, A Spirit of Trust. A Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology, Cambridge (MA)-London 2019.

15. Closing meeting.

How will the participants benefit from taking part in the course?

The course will allow the participants to get acquainted with some of the most important questions and answers from the field of the philosophy of law, in particular with some of the most important questions and theories concerning the nature of law, methods of the legal sciences, relations of the philosophy of law and other areas of philosophy, and functions fulfilled by the law in the society. It will allow the participants to develop an ability to theorize and to broaden their knowledge of the philosophy of law. Moreover, problems brought up throughout the course belong to the - not the smallest, anyway - group of the most important questions of modernity, still waiting to be answered, and the process of answering which is progressing slowly and steadily.