Russia.Ukraine.War 2100-ERASMUS-RUWA

The subject of the present course is the analysis of relations between the two most populous
countries of the former USSR: the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The main
objective is to examine the previously existing dependencies of Ukraine on the
Russian Federation, the hybrid conflict between two countries in 2014 - 2022 and the full-scale war which followed.

At the end of the first millennium A.D. most of the Ukrainian
territories as well as the Western Russian lands became part of the Kyivan Rus:
the first state of the Eastern Slavs. The Grand Prince Volodymyr adopted
Christianity from Constantinople, thus placing the Eastern Slavic lands within
the sphere of Byzantine (Orthodox) culture. In the 13th and 14th
centuries the Western Ruthenian lands were under the Polish and Lithuanian
rule, while the Eastern lands – under the Mongolian one. After rejecting the
dependence from the Golden Horde, it was the Duchy of Moscow that began to gain
increasing significance in the region. Meanwhile, in the Polish-Lithuanian
state, the contention between the central authorities and the Cossacks, who
exerted political dominance over the Ruthenian lands, escalated. In the 17th
century, the dispute turned into an armed conflict, and the Cossacks sought
protection from the Russian tsar. This resulted in the outbreak of the
Polish-Russian war, which led to the incorporation of the left-bank Ukraine
into Russia. After the partitioning of the Polish State the majority of the
right-bank Ukraine also became part of the Russian empire. In the second half
of the 19th century, writers and political activists from Ukraine came
to the fore, voicing ideas about the distinctiveness of the Ukrainian and the
Russian nations. However, their activities were repressed by the tsarist
authorities. It was the First World War and the revolution in Russia that
brought new possibilities. In 1917 the creation of Ukrainian People’s Republic
was proclaimed. However, the state turned out to be short-lived and in 1921
most of the Ukrainian lands came under the Bolshevik rule. The Soviet
authorities, unlike the tsarist Russia, acknowledged the existence of the
Ukrainian nation. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic became one of the
founding states of the USSR (in 1922). Ukrainian education was introduced and
limited development of Ukrainian culture was made possible. The economic policy
of the Soviet authorities resulted in the modernisation and industrialisation
of the country, but, in the long run, turned out ineffective. Collectivisation
and the repressive policy towards the Ukrainian peasantry contributed to the
Great Famine of 1932-1933. In the 1940s, most of the Ukrainian lands were
united within the borders of the USSR, but it was at the expense of persecution
of the opponents of the new regime and attempts to eradicate the culture of
Western Ukraine. The symbol of this ineffective and thoughtless policy was the
nuclear disaster in Chernobyl (1986), which significantly contributed to the
intensification of independence movements in Ukraine.

In 1991 Ukraine became indepedent. The dependence of the Ukrainian political system on Russia stemmed from the lack of a longer state tradition in Ukraine, the political and economic benefits that political decision-makers derived from the co-operation with the Russian Federation, as well as other types of dependencies which in some way forced Ukraine to co-operate with the Russian neighbour. The existence of the aforementioned dependencies could be confirmed by the evolution of the Ukrainian political system over the last twenty years, as well as by the actions of the main political actors in Ukraine. The political systems of Ukraine and Russia underwent a similar evolution after 1991: from a mixed presidential-parliamentary system which led to conflicts between the legislative and the executive powers, to the new constitution which introduced a presidential syste

The economic dependence stems from the centralised character of the Soviet economy and the lack of a consistent reform policy in Ukraine after 1991, which could have led to the elimination of links existing between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The most visible manifestation of Ukraine’s economic dependence on Russia is energy dependence. Ukraine’s economy is energy-intensive, which forces Ukraine to import energy resources (mainly gas) from Russia, or via Russia from Central Asia. An important advantage which makes it difficult for Russia to exploit the situation is the fact that Ukraine is a transit country for most of the Russian gas exported to the European Union. Therefore, Russia is seeking to become independent from the Ukrainian middleman. The commercial dependence also plays an important part. Russia is Ukraine’s biggest commercial partner, and some branches of Ukrainian economy (for example machine industry) depend to a large extent on the Russian market. Finally, the Russian Federation is an important investor in Ukraine. Official data suggests that Russian investment is significantly smaller than that of the European Union countries. One can suspect, however, that this data does not reflect the reality. A significant part of Russian investment is made covertly, for example via tax havens. As a result, Russia controls a significant part of the Ukrainian economy.

The security and defence dependencies are a result of common membership of Russia and Ukraine in the USSR, as well as the asymmetry in the military potential of both countries. In the last 20 years, the following issues were of particular importance: the post-Soviet nuclear weapons located in Ukraine, the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Ukraine-Russia border, the industrial and military co-operation between the two countries and the conflict in Transnistria. After 1991, pressure from Russia and the Western states notwithstanding, Ukraine delayed the transfer of the post-Soviet nuclear weapons to the Russian Federation, which had a significant negative impact on the image of Ukraine in the West. 1994 saw the signing of agreements, in which Ukraine committed to returning post-Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia in return for limited warranties from the Western powers and the Russian Federation, as well as financial aid. Only in 1997 Russia and Ukraine reached accord regarding the division of the post-Soviet Black Sea Fleet. The Ukrainian authorities agreed to further stationing of the Russian part of the fleet in Ukraine; initially until 2017, and then until at least 2042. Also in 1997 both countries confirmed the Ukraine-Russia border; however, the process of delimitation and demarcation has not been completed to this date, due to Russia’s reluctance to such a solution. Military co-operation seems justified from the economic point of view due to the existence of an enormous defence industry in both countries since the Soviet times. From a political perspective, however, this co-operation hinders the development of other partnerships by Ukraine (e.g. the NATO) and increases Ukraine’s dependence on Russia in the area of security and defence. A significant challenge for Ukraine is the existence of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic, an internationally unrecognized entity supported by Russia, which neighbours directly with Ukraine. Ukrainian authorities do not undertake any decisive action to resolve this problem, de facto supporting Transnistria. This stems both from the desire to maintain friendly relations with Russia, and the wish to keep the benefits brought by co-operation with the unrecognized republic.

Many years of Ukrainian lands belonging to the Russian empire and later the USSR contributed to creating strong societal dependencies between Ukraine and Russia. An important role was played in particular by voluntary and forced migrations, both from Russia to Ukraine and vice versa, as well as the policy of Russification implemented by Russian and Soviet authorities. As a result, there is a large Russian minority in Ukraine. It is particularly strong in the Southern and Eastern regions, as well as in Crimea, which, discreetly supported by the Russian authorities, in the 1990s undertook actions aimed at gaining partial independence from Ukraine. However, societal dependencies are not only related to the existence of a Russian minority in Ukraine. The majority of Ukrainian society is in favour of a close co-operation with Russia, considering it is an important partner for Ukraine. What is more, one can observe strong regional differentiation in Ukraine’s approach to relations with the Russian Federation. The inhabitants of Southern and Eastern Ukraine are more favourable towards co-operation with the Russian neighbour, whereas those living in Western and Central regions display relatively greater scepticism. It is also worth noting that there is a large community of Ukrainians living in Russia: some of Russian citizenship, others who came after 1991 in search of employment.

Dependencies in the field of culture and ideology had similar roots as the societal ones. Moreover, independent Ukraine had a decidedly smaller cultural potential than Russia, which made it easy for the latter to penetrate Ukrainian society. The dependencies manifested themselves in four principal areas. Firstly, the Russian language, which was officially the second most common language in Ukraine, but in reality, dominated the Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine, the press, and the digital media. The Ukrainian authorities made some attempts at the Ukrainisation of society, while Russia was in favour of adopting Russian as the official language in Ukraine. The second element was the legacy of Soviet historiography in Ukraine. After 1991, Ukraine tried to create its own national history, but some important events, such as the Second World War, were still viewed through the lens of Soviet or Russian historiography by most of the political class and society. One of the two most important denominations in Ukraine was the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), part of the Russian Orthodox Church. It was closely affiliated with the Russian authorities and promoted ideas consistent with the political line of the Russian Federation, such as the unity of the three Slavic nations. Finally, the last noteworthy element was the position of Russia in the Ukrainian media system. This position was a consequence both of the popularity of the central (i.e., Moscow-based) media in Soviet times, as well as of the weakness of the Ukrainian media. The Ukrainian society still liked to watch Russian television and read newspapers mostly edited in Russia; also, Russian websites enjoyed great popularity in Ukraine.

The last important area of Ukrainian dependence on Russia was Ukraine’s foreign policy. Ever since 1991 Russia had been making efforts to reintegrate the post-Soviet area, or only some countries of the region; and Ukraine had been an important subject of these efforts for the Russian authorities. The Ukrainian authorities had consequently resisted Russian aspirations by blocking the attempts to strengthen the Community of Independent States (CIS) and the Common Economic Area, as well as by refusing to join the Customs Union. Russia’s attempts to hinder Ukraine’s co-operation with the NATO and the EU turned out more effective. It was a result of both objective difficulties that Ukraine had in meeting the requirements of the Western institutions and the Ukrainian society opposing the attempts to join the NATO, as well as the reluctance of the Western states to co-operate more closely with Ukraine, which could negatively affect their relations with Russia.

the pro-European “Euromaidan” revolution in Ukraine in
2013 – 2014 led to a growing social discontent in Eastern Ukraine, in
particular in the Donbas, while the weakness of the post-revolutionary
Ukrainian state made possible for the development of local separatism. Russia
exploited the existing situation and after the illegal annexation of Crimea manu
militari supported the separatism – first through local proxies and
security services, then through direct military engagement. The Russian strategy
brought only partial success. In the Donbas region two quasi-states – the
Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics were established, however Ukraine did
not fall apart and the Novorossiya (New Russia) which was to be made of
South-Eastern Ukrainian regions never came to be. The existence of DPR and LPR
and the ongoing conflict in the Donbas proved to be considerable challenge for
new post-revolutionary Ukrainian authorities. However the war with Russia
strengthened the cohesion of the Ukrainian society, as well as its national
identity, and forced Ukraine to develop and modernize its army, with the help
of the West. In consequence Ukraine has been much better prepared of the
Russian aggression in 2022

Since 2014 Russia had been unable to derail the
post-Maidan Ukraine, however in 2020 – 2022 it strengthened its position in the
other post-Soviet states (Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan). In that context
Russia decided to invade Ukraine, which independence the Russian authorities
had never truly recognized. Russian forces entered Ukraine from the north
(Belarus), the east (Russia, Donbas) and the south (Crimea). Russia massively shelled
Ukrainian cities - its targets were both residential buildings (Kharkiv) and
critical infrastructure, while the Russian troops committed war crimes, which
victims were primarily civilians (Bucha and other locations in Kyiv region).
Russia hoped to capture Kyiv within few days to establish there a pro-Russian
puppet regime, but its design completely failed – it has captured only one oblast
city (Kherson) and over 2022 had to retreat first from the occupied Kyiv and
then also Kharkiv region. In autumn 2022 Russia annexed Kherson and
Zaporizhzhia regions, as well as Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics, but
this decision had little practical meaning. Russia’s failure was due to the
fierce resistance of the Ukrainians led by the president Volodymyr Zelensky and
massive aid Ukraine received from the West. The full-scale war in Ukraine led
to the redefinition of West relations with both Ukraine and Russia. Ukraine has
been recognized as a candidate to the European Union, while Zelensky became a Western
pop culture hero. On the other hand Russia has largely cut off from the West,
in particular in the energy sector.