Philosophy of Mind 3800-FU24-M

Ist semester
The first semester of lectures is devoted primarily to the reconstruction and analysis of metaphysical and methodological issues within contemporary philosophy of mind. Among such issues are: (i) the nature and structure of mental states (events, properties); (ii) criteria of distinguishing mental states from physical states; (iii) types of mental states; (iv) binding relations between mental states and physical states; (v) prospects for reduction of the mental domain to the physical domain; (vi) the mental causation debate; (vii) existence and knowledge of other minds; (viii) existence of the self and criteria of personal identity through time.
At the heart of topics being discussed is the classic psychophysical problem which manifests itself in the following questions: (1) Does the mental domain even exist? (2) If the mental domain really exists, what relations are there between it and the physical domain? (3) If the physical domain is causally closed, how is mental causation possible and how is it in fact realised? The problem in question boils down essentially to the question of what is the place for the conscious and active mind in a world that is thoroughly physical.
The plan of the lecture in the first semester covers the following topics: 1. Fundamental problems and issues in philosophy of mind. Metaphysical issues. 2. Types of mental states and criteria of mentality. Psychophysical relations. 3. Dualist solutions to the mind-body problem (substantial dualism: Cartesian and non-Cartesian dualism, property dualism, predicate dualism, hylemorphic dualism, emergent dualism). 4. Logical, methodological and ontological behaviourism. The "other minds" problem. 5. The type and token identity theories. Arguments and counterarguments. 6. Eliminative materialism. 7. Anomalous monism. 8. Non-reductive physicalism - functionalism, supervenience physicalism (multiple realizability, supervenience, realization, arguments, objections). 9. Non-constructive naturalism. 10. The problem of mental causation (the causal closure principle, the argument from causal exclusion, reactions to the argument. 11. "Old" and "New" epiphenomenalism. The dual-aspect theory. 12. Instrumentalism. 13. Emergentist solutions. 14. Panpsychism. 15. The problem of personal identity: problems, views, arguments.
2nd semester
The second part of the lecture includes a critical analysis and reconstruction of the following philosophical topics discussed in contemporary philosophy of mind:
(i) The computational theory of mind [the concept of Turing machine, its mathematical content and applications in mathematics, the notion of computability in the intuitive sense and in the Turing sense, Church-Turing thesis and its significance for the philosophy of mind, analysis of the mind-as-computer metaphor];
(ii) The theories of consciousness [history of the concept of consciousness, distinction between easy and hard problem of consciousness, analysis of the most important types of consciousness (state vs access vs. phenomenal consciousness), analysis of the nature and aspects of consciousness: realist vs. anti-realist theories of consciousness, analysis and criticism of the higher order thought and inner awareness theory of consciousness, relations between consciousness and intentionality, distinction between phenomenal and functional properties, status in the context of the dispute between different versions of reductionist and anti-reductionist theories of mind];
(iii) The problem of phenomenal consciousness, impressions and qualia (philosophical roots: Locke (ideas of secondary properties), Hume (problem of impression and ideas), Kant, Lotze, Peirce, Wittgenstein (sensations, private language, question about Wittgenstein's position), intentional properties and sense data according to W. Sellars, place pf qualia in the context of the reductionism-anti-reductionism dispute (i.e. classical emergentism, classical identity theory, newer forms of anti-reductionism (Jackson, Nagel, Chalmers) and their arguments (knowledge arguments and arguments modal), a critique of the new anti-reductionism regarding consciousness and qualia (Dennett, Churchland, Searle);
(iv) The problem of intentionality [most significant theories of intentionality, criteria of identity for intentional states, problem of content of the propositional attitudes];
(v) An analysis of the dispute between internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind (mental content internalism and externalism, Chalmers and Clark’s active externalism);
(vi) The concept and status of folk psychology, including an analysis of arguments in favor of eliminativism;
(vii) An analysis of the nature of perception, introspection, memory, imagination, emotions and empathy, etc .;
(viii) Problems of the existence of animal minds and the possibility of knowledge about other people's minds;
(ix) Analysis of philosophical problems related to the volitional sphere (free will, intentions, volitions, intentional actions, tryings).