Auction theory 1000-2M13TAU
1.Single unit auctions
a.Auctions with private valuations: first and second price auctions, revenue equivalence principle, effects of risk aversion, budget restrictions and asymmetry of valuations
b.Mechanism design: revelation principle, optimal mechanisms, Vickerey-Clark-Groves mechanism
c.Interdependent valuations: English auction, ranking auctions wrt revenue, effects of asymmetric information, minimal prices and entry fees
d.Efficient allocations
e.Collusion
f.All-pay auctions
2.Multi-unit auctions
a.Discriminatory auctions, Uniform-price auctions and Vickrey auction vs open bid auctions (English, Dutch and Ausubel)
b.Efficiency and equilibria for different action formats
c.Revenue equivalence for multi-unit auctions
d.Sequential auctions
e.Nonidentical objects, interdependent valuations
3.Combinatorial auctions: winner determination problem, bidding language and communication complexity, iterative auctions
Type of course
Prerequisites
Course coordinators
Learning outcomes
Knowledge:
Knows basic auction formats
Understands impact of incomplete information, risk aversion, budget restrictions, valuations asymmetry, ,minimal prices and entry fees on different auction formats
Knows and understands revelation principle
Knows the notion of optimal mechanism and VCG mechanism
Knows and understands revenue equivalence principle
Knows and understands the notion of allocation efficiency
Knows the winner determination problem and the problem of communication complexity for combinatorial auctions
Skills:
Is capable of finding Nash equilibria for different auction formats and under different assumptions about the participants
Is capable of evaluating different auction formats from buyers' and seller's perspectives
Is capable for evaluating different auction formats in face of collusion
Is capable of evaluating succinctness of different bidding languages and the associated interpretation complexity
Competences:
Knows basic problems associated with auctions and is capable of analysing auctions against these problems
Knows limits of own knowledge and understands the need for further study, including interdisciplinary knowledge (K_K01)
Is capable for posing precise questions that help to deepen own understanding of the given topic (in particular when facing non-computer-scientists) or finding missing parts of the reasoning (K_K02)
Assessment criteria
Final grade based on the score from written exam. Same criteria in retake session.
Bibliography
Basic literature
V. Krishna, Auction theory
N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, V. Vazirani, Algorithmic game theory
Supplementary literature
P. Klemperer, Auctions: Theory and practice (http://www.paulklemperer.org/)
L. Ausubel, Auction Theory for the New Economy (http://www.bsos.umd.edu/econ/ausubel/auction-theory-new-economy.pdf)
M. Osborne, A. Rubinstein, A course in game theory (http://books.osborne.economics.utoronto.ca/)
Additional information
Information on level of this course, year of study and semester when the course unit is delivered, types and amount of class hours - can be found in course structure diagrams of apropriate study programmes. This course is related to the following study programmes:
- Bachelor's degree, first cycle programme, Computer Science
- Master's degree, second cycle programme, Computer Science
Additional information (registration calendar, class conductors, localization and schedules of classes), might be available in the USOSweb system: