Problemy filozofii eksperymentalnej: potoczne teorie przyczynowości 3800-PFE24-S

Seminarium ma charakter badawczy. Jednym z warunków zaliczenia jest przygotowywanie i przeprowadzenie w zespole badania z zakresu filozofii eksperymentalnej.

Szczegółowa lista zagadnień (semestr I i część semestru II)

BLOK 1. NORMALNOŚĆ I TYPOWOŚĆ A PRZYCZYNOWOŚĆ
– Knobe, J., Fraser B. (2008). “Causal judgment and moral judgment. Two experiments”, in: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.): Moral psychology. Vol. 2. The cognitive science of morality. Intuition and diversity. Cambridge: The MIT Press, pp. 441-447.
– Roxborough C., Cumby J. (2009). “Folk psychological concepts. Causation”, Philosophical Psychology 22 (2), pp. 205-213.
– Sytsma, J., Livengood, J., & Rose, D. (2012). Two types of typicality: Rethinking the role of statistical typicality in ordinary causal attributions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 43(4), 814-820.
– Morris, A. et al. (2019). “Quantitative causal selection patterns in token causation”, PLOS ONE 14 (8), e0219704.
– Gill M. et al. (2022). “An interaction effect of norm violations on causal judgment”, Cognition 228, 105183.

BLOK 2. ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚĆ, WINA A PRZYPISYWANIE PRZYCZYNOWOŚCI
– Hitchcock, C., & Knobe, J. (2009). Cause and norm. The Journal of Philosophy, 106(11), 587-612.
– Alicke, M. D., Rose, D., & Bloom, D. (2011). Causation, norm violation, and culpable control. The Journal of Philosophy, 108(12), 670-696. (oraz jako kontekst: Alicke, M., & Rose, D. (2010). Culpable control or moral concepts?. Behavioral and brain sciences, 33(4), 330-331)
– Danks, D., Rose, D., & Machery, E. (2014). Demoralizing causation. Philosophical Studies, 171, 251-277.
– Rogers R. et al. (2019). “Causal deviance and the ascription of intent and blame”, Philosophical Psychology 32 (3), pp. 404-427.
– Sytsma J. (2022). “Crossed wires. Blaming artifacts for bad outcomes”, Journal of Philosophy 119 (9), 489-516.
– Güver L., Kneer M. (2023). “Causation and the silly norm effect”, in: Stefan Magen and Karolina Prochownik (Eds.): Advances in experimental philosophy of law. London: Bloomsbury.

BLOK 3. PRZYCZYNOWOŚĆ A MYŚLENIE KONTRFAKTYCZNE
– Halpern J., Hitchcock C. (2015) “Graded causation and defaults”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2), pp. 413-457.
– Kominsky J. et al. (2015). Causal superseding. Cognition 137 (C):196-209.
– Icard, T., Kominsky J., Knobe J. (2017). “Normality and actual causal strength”, Cognition 161, pp. 80-93.
– Quillien T. (2020). “When do we think that X caused Y?”, Cognition 205, 104410.
– Gerstenberg T. el. (2021). “A counterfactual simulation model of causal judgments for physical events”, Psychological Review 128 (5), pp. 936-975.

BLOK 4. PRZYCZYNY A ZANIECHANIA
– Livengood, J., & Machery, E. (2007). The folk probably don't think what you think they think: Experiments on causation by absence. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31(1), 107-127.
– Clarke, R. et al. (2015): “Causation, norms, and omissions. A study of causal judgments”, Philosophical Psychology 28 (2), pp. 279-293.
– Willemsen P., Reuter K. (2016). “Is there really an omission effect?”, Philosophical Psychology
29 (8), pp. 1142-1159.
– Henne P. et al. (2019): “A counterfactual explanation for the action effect in causal judgment”, Cognition 190, pp. 157-164.

BLOK 5. PORZĄDEK CZASOWY, UDAREMNIANIE I PODWÓJNE ZAPOBIEGANIE
– Lagnado D., Channon S (2008). “Judgments of cause and blame. The effects of intentionality and foreseeability”, Cognition 108 (3), pp. 754-770.
– Lombrozo, T. (2010). Causal–explanatory pluralism: How intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions. Cognitive psychology, 61(4), 303-332.
– Reuter K., et al. (2014): “The good, the bad, and the timely. How temporal order and moral judgment influence causal selection”, Frontiers in Psychology 5, 1336
– Henne P. et al. (2021). Counterfactual thinking and recency effects in causal judgment. Cognition, 212, 104708.
– Ziano I., Pandelaere M. (2022). “Late-action effect. Heightened counterfactual potency and perceived outcome reversibility make actions closer to a definitive outcome seem more causally impactful”, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 100, 104290.
– Henne P., O’Neill K. (2022). “Double prevention, causal judgments, and counterfactuals”, Cognitive Science 46 (5), e13127