Advanced Microeconomics (Game Theory) 2400-ICU1AMI
Game Theory
1. Introduction
Osborne, ch.1
2. Nash Equilibrium: Theory
Osborne, ch.2
3. Nash Equilibrium: Illustrations
Osborne, ch.3
4. Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
Osborne, ch.4
5. Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Theory
Osborne, ch.5
6. Extensive Games With Perfect Information: Illustrations
Osborne, ch.6
7. Coalitional Games and the Core
Osborne, ch. 8
8. Bayesian Games
Osborne, ch. 9
9. Auctions
Osborne, chs. 3 and 9
10. Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
Osborne, ch. 10
11. Extensive Games with Imperfect Information II
Osborne, ch. 11
12. Evolutionary Equilibrium
Osborne, ch. 13
13. Repeated Games: Introduction
Osborne, ch. 14
14 Repeated Games: Folk Theorem
Osborne, ch. 15
15. Bargaining
Osborne, ch. 16
General Equilibrium Theory
1-2. DUALITY APPROACH TO DEMAND PROPERTIES
Money metric utility function, Roy's identity, Walrasian Demand, Welfare measures (MC, pp. 40-95; V, pp. 94-113)
2-3. NEO-WALRASIAN THEORY OF PRODUCTION
Free disposability in production, Axioms of production, Efficient production
5. Midterm exam
6. 2x2 PURE EXCHANGE MODEL
Nonwasteful Feasible Allocation, Endowment, Offer Curve, Pareto Set, Contract Curve (V, pp.313-316, 323-329; MC, pp. 515-525, 538-540)
7-8. 1x1x2x1 ROBINSON CRUSOE MODEL. 2X2X2X2 SMALL OPEN ECONOMY
Excess Demand, Intermediate Goods, Production Possibility Set, Interior Equilibrium, Rybczynski Tehorem, Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, Factor Price Equalization Theorem (MC, pp. 525-538)
9-10.GENERAL MODEL
Private Ownership Economy, Walrasian (quasi)equilibrium, (Quasi)equilibrium with transfers, Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics, Locally nonsatiation preferences, Walras' Law (V, pp.317-322, 329-332; MC, pp. 545-557, 578-583)
COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELING (classes in a computer lab.):
11 GAMS software, i/o table, simple exercises
12. A pure exchange model in GAMS
13. A 2x2x1 production model
14. Open economy model
15. Alternative production functions. Endogeneous labour supply
Rodzaj przedmiotu
Koordynatorzy przedmiotu
Efekty kształcenia
Knowledge and skills
1. Students understand the basic concepts of game theory including different equilibrium concepts.
2. Students understand the applications of game theory to various social and economic contexts.
3. Students learn how to build game-theoretic models to enhance their understanding of social, economic and political concepts.
4. Students know and understand the preference relations concept and the concept of utility maximization. Students understand the duality in consumer theory.
5. Students know and understand the producer behaviour. They are aware of the duality of producer problem
6. Students know and understand the methods of economic welfare evaluation.
7. Students are able to solve and analyze the following general equilibrium models: the pure exchange model, the Robinson Crusoe model, and the small open economy model.
8. Students understand the basic theorems of welfare economics. They are able to distinguish competitive equilibrium from the Pareto optimum allocation/social planner allocation.
9. Students know how to implement a simple GE model in GAMS software
10. Students know how to evaluate changes in economic environment with the use of simple GE model
General skills
1. Students understand that microeconomics and game theory can be applied to real economic and social issues and that the analysis can be performed using economic models
2. Students can interpret reality based on simple GE models and they are able to combine the micro and macro view.
3. Students are able to undertake employment in entreprises or public organizations that deal with design and assessment of economic policy
4. Students are able to formulate and present their views based on their knowledge and engage in discussion concerning these views.
5. Students are able to fulfill their duties and plan the work schedule on their own.
SW01, SW02, SW03, SW04, SU01, SU02, SU03, SU04, SU05, SU06, SU07, SK01, SK02, SK03
Kryteria oceniania
Completing Advanced Microeconomics requires completing the two separate parts:
o Game Theory – dr hab. Krzysztof Szczygielski, prof. ucz.
o General Equilibrium Theory– dr hab. Jan Hagemejer, prof. ucz.
• In order to complete each of the parts students need to:
o Collect at least 50% combined points from the two following components:
midterm exam (weighted 50%);
final exam (50%).
• The final grade will be average of the grades from the two separate parts (rounded up), with the restriction of both of them being at least 3 (otherwise the final grade becomes 2).
• All exams are to be taken by all students at the same time (only one date for everyone).
• There will be only one possibility to retake any of the failed exams for all students at the same time.
• Absence from any of the exams is equivalent to failing it.
• There will be no other possibilities of completing the course.
• ‘0 tolerance for cheating’.
Literatura
(O) Osborne, M. J. (2009). An introduction to game theory. International Edition, New York: Oxford University Press.
(MC) Mas-Colell, A., M. D. Whinston, J. R. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995
(V) Varian, H. R., Microeconomic Analysis, W. W. Norton & COsborne, ed. 3′
Varian, H. R., Intermediate Microeconomics, ed. 7
Więcej informacji
Dodatkowe informacje (np. o kalendarzu rejestracji, prowadzących zajęcia, lokalizacji i terminach zajęć) mogą być dostępne w serwisie USOSweb: