Equilibria, institutions, false beliefs. Lecture in philosophy of economics 3800-RIFP26-M
The lecture undertakes a philosophical inquiry of economics, not only as a specific discipline but also as a form of reflection on human action and rationality that is closely related to philosophy. This is not an attempt to describe certain problems in economics (such as methodological issues) from a “bird’s-eye view” and to present their philosophical interpretation, but rather to trace the points of contact between the two fields. One may therefore say that the course is concerned more with philosophy in economics than with the traditionally understood philosophy of economics, although the latter will also occupy an important place. As in the previous edition of the course, the main emphasis will be placed on issues closely related to game theory, namely, the concepts of beliefs, instrumental action, and rationality. Game theory, being a central paradigm of modern economics, can also serve as valuable tool for philosophers interested in rationality and action.
More detailed topics will include:
- introduction to game theory and its philosophical interpretations;
- interventionist account of causality;
- models of self-confirming equilibria and false beliefs, in particular, models of J. Pearl and R. Spiegler;
- Newcomb’s problem and the two decision theories;
- quantum decision theory;
- models of non-instrumental action, such as so-called Kantian optimization/equilibrium;
- rationality as a systemic property;
- game-theoretic reasoning in philosophy, e.g., in Hume, Hobbes, or Rawls.
Course coordinators
Type of course
Learning outcomes
- familiarity with the basic concepts of game theory and decision theory (equilibrium, strategy, beliefs) and their philosophical interpretations;
- understanding of how game-theoretic tools can be applied to selected philosophical problems;
- awareness of the philosophical implications of certain problems in decision theory.
- ability to critically analyze philosophical arguments;
- ability to examine issues arising at the intersection of game theory, decision theory, and philosophy of mind.
- openness to ways of thinking that depart from commonly accepted views;
- ability to seek new solutions through cooperation with others;
- ability to engage with others’ arguments in a constructive and respectful manner.
Assessment criteria
essay
Bibliography
Barrett, J. (2020). Punishment and disagreement in the state of nature. Economics & Philosophy, 36(3), 334-354.
Bates, R., Greif, A., & Singh, S. (2002). Organizing violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(5), 599-628.
Braham, M., & Van Hees, M. (2020). Kantian kantian optimization. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 13(2), 30-42.
Busemeyer, J. (2012). Quantum Models of Cognition and Decision. Cambridge University Press.
Heilmann, C. (2022). The routledge handbook of the philosophy of economics. J. Reiss (Ed.). Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
Horgan, T. (1981). Counterfactuals and Newcomb's problem. The Journal of Philosophy, 78(6), 331-356.
Howe, R. E., & Roemer, J. E. (1981). Rawlsian Justice as the Core of a Game. The American Economic Review, 71(5), 880-895.
Melenovsky, C. M. (Ed.). (2022). The Routledge handbook of philosophy, politics, and economics (No. 302254). New York: Routledge.
Okasha, S. (2012). Social justice, genomic justice and the veil of ignorance: Harsanyi meets Mendel. Economics & Philosophy, 28(1), 43-71.
Pearl, J., Glymour, M., & Jewell, N. P. (2016). Causal inference in statistics: a primer. John Wiley & Sons.
Pourvand, K. (2025). State legitimacy and self-fulfilling dynamics. Economics & Philosophy, 1-24.
Price H., Corry, R. (Eds.). (2007). Causation, physics, and the constitution of reality: Russell's republic revisited. Clarendon Press.
Sher, I. (2020). Normative aspects of Kantian equilibrium. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 13(2), 43-84.
Spiegler, R. (2016). Bayesian networks and boundedly rational expectations. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(3), 1243-1290.
Vanderschraaf, P. (1998). The informal game theory in Hume's account of convention. Economics & Philosophy, 14(2), 215-247.
Załuski, W. (2003). The concept of Kantian rationality and game theory. In Epistemology and Ontology: IVR-Symposium Lund (pp. 185-195).
Notes
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Term 2026Z:
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