(in Polish) Reading Heidegger III 3800-RH26-S

Phenomenology as such appeared as a reaction to a particular philosophical currents and
tendencies such psychologism, subjectivism, simplified empiricism, positivistic and neo-
positivistic scientism, but also as a reaction to abstract metaphysical speculation. Thus, it was
founded on one basic postulate – “getting back to the things themselves.” That means, it is to
work as a critical effort of clearing up the space of our experience of reality and of ourselves
from all distortions, all artificially constructed, abstract concepts of reality and our modes of
experiencing it. Thus, its foundational motivation was a genuine care for the truth of human
experience of the world and of themselves; a genuine care for „what” really appears and
„how” what appears manifests itself in different modi of its appearance. In doing so, it goes
beyond artificially constructed divisions to reveal an essential, insurmountable entanglement
of subject and object, subjectivity and objectivity, factuality and possibility, and so forth. In
this sense phenomenology is a constantly renewed attempt to answer the question of how the
objective reality can be (and is) there for us, how it appears (is constituted), in its different
forms, within the field of subjective experience. One of the distinctive metaphilosophical
features of phenomenology is a fundamental tension between transcendentalism, which
absolutizes subject giving it an ontological priority, on the one hand; and on the other hand,
an existential-ontological perspective where the human being is always already determined by
his/her life-world and primordial, pre-reflective forms of experience. This tension clearly
visible in the late works of Husserl – the founding father of the contemporary phenomenology
– is suspended in philosophy of Martin Heidegger. In Heidegger’s view a truly radical
phenomenological concept of experience leads us to the understanding of the human being as
being-in-the-world; that is, as being essentially, and not accidentally, immersed in the world.
This facticity is an “absolute” starting point of all human experiences and their
thematizations. In this sense the foundational question of phenomenology – concerning the
possibility of world’s existence (in fact, no longer contested) turns out to be a more radical
question – a question concerning the very possibility of the human being. If so, then
phenomenology must transform itself from somehow distantiated observation, still bound by
traditional theoretical approach (typical, to a large extent, for Husserl’s version of
phenomenology), into an active involvement. It is by means and through the latter that
phenomenology (meaning philosophy in general) can fulfill its only task – to pose a question
about meaning of Being, and to project possible answers. Human beings become what they
are as a relentless, engaged activity of questioning and projecting this meaning. In whatever
they do – being it an activity of practical or theoretical nature – this meaning is already laid
down. However, it is never ultimate, final, complete. It is projected from within human
immersion into their world, and thus, it is always determined by tradition, history of previous
insights and efforts. Thus, one of the main points of Heidegger’s phenomenology is that the
mystery of Being, and along with it that of human’s “essence”, lies in its temporal and
historical nature. That is why phenomenology cannot be neutral, “objective”, distantiated
description of a form and matter of our experiences. Heidegger’s version of phenomenology
calls for hermeneutics – understood as both human efforts of understanding Being and
philosophical efforts of revealing the meaning of these efforts, of questioning their conditions
of possibility. And that is why it must simultaneously take on a double form – that of an
existential analysis (fundamental ontology), and that of historical-hermeneutical investigation.
The course is planned as a thorough analysis (a careful, detailed – “sentence by sentence” -
reading) of Heidegger’s opus magnum. It is a continuation of the seminar conducted for the
last two years, but it is open to students who did not participate in that seminar. We will begin
with a brief presentation the conclusions and then continue with detailed reading (starting
with chapter VI, Division One).