Institutional Economics 2400-M2EINSTYT
During classes students will discuss the following topics:
• Introduction to New Institutional Economics
• Property rights
• Transaction Costs
• Agency theory
• Child labour
• Institutions as a source of comparative advantage
• The impact of social norms on economic outcomes
• Vertical integration
• Decentralisation
• Collective action
Type of course
Prerequisites (description)
Course coordinators
Learning outcomes
Knowledge:
Upon completion of the course a student knows basic theories that describe relationships between institutions and economic outcomes. He/she is able to recognize the complexity of the collective decision making process. He/she knows the main economic institutions that shape the economic policy. Based on the theories presented during the class, a student is able to indicate the main channels through which institutions may affect economic outcomes and the way in which economic conditions influence the institutions.
Skills:
Upon completion of the course a student is able to discuss arguments in favor and against the importance of economic institutions for economic outcomes. He/she is able to critically asses the current debate on the relationship between institutions and economic outcomes and conditions.
Social competences:
Upon completion of the course a student is able to present his views in front of the class. He/she knows how to participate in the discussion, paying due respect to other discussants and their views.
KW01, KW02, KW03, KW04, KU01, KU02, KU03, KU04, KU05, KU06, KU07, KK01, KK02, KK03
Assessment criteria
Assessment will be based on written examination
Bibliography
• D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, (2005). “Unbundling institutions.”, Journal of Political Economy 113(5), 949-995.
• Bardhan, P. (2002), Decentralization of Governance and Development, Journal of Economic Perspectives 16 (4), 185-205.
• Besley, T. (1995), Property rights and investment incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana, Journal of Political Economy 103 (5), 903-937.
• Christopher Udry (2004) „Child Labor” (http://www.econ.yale.edu/~cru2//papers.html)
• De Soto, H. (2001), The Mystery of Capital, Finance and Development 38 (1).
• Eggertsson, T. (1997), The old theory of economic policy and new institutionalism, World Development 25(8), 1187-1203. (online through BUW)
• Hayek, F. (2004), The Fatal Conceit. The errors of socialism, ch. 4 (library)
• Jensen i Meckling 1976 „Theory of the Firm”, Journal of Financial Economics 3(4), 305-360.
• Johnson, S., McMillan, J., Woodruff, C. (2002), Courts and Relational Contracts, Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 18 (1), 221-277.
• „Nobel Prize Lecture by Elinor Ostrom” (https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/ostrom_lecture.pdf)
• North, D. (1996), Institutions, institutional change and economic performance; part I (library)
• Nunn N, Trefler D. (2014). Domestic Institutions as a Source of Comparative Advantage. In: Gopinath G, Helpman E, Rogoff K Handbook of International Economics. Vol. 4. North Holland, pp. 263-315.
• Olson, M. (2000). Power and prosperity, Basic Books, chapters 5 & 6, 89-110.
• Przeworski, A. (2003). States and Markets, Cambridge University Press, chapter 5, 79-98.
• Williamson, O. (1971), Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, American Economic Review 61, 112-123.
• Williamson, O. (2000), The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, Journal of Economic Literature XXXVIII, str. 595-613
Additional information
Additional information (registration calendar, class conductors, localization and schedules of classes), might be available in the USOSweb system: